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Epistemology of the Neurodynamics of Mind
(Commentary on Marks-Tarlow’s “A Fractal Epistemology for Transpersonal Psychology”)

Frederick David Abraham
The Blueberry Brain Institute
Waterbury, VT, USA

N

eurodynamics may shed light on understanding the relationship between subjective
experience and scientific explorations of mind
and behavior. Marks-Tarlow (2020) raises this as an issue
in the history of transpersonal psychology. I focus on
this issue in the tradition of Freeman’s neurodynamics
and related cognitive neuroscience rather than the
transcendental aspects of transpersonal psychology.
This involves some basic concepts of dynamical
systems. It also involves electrophysiology and neuroimaging. It also raises some philosophical issues.
A basic premise of this article is that phenomenological / experiential and objective / empirical
approaches inform each other while informing our
concepts of reality, mind, and transpersonal transactions. I believe that some nuances of science could
contribute to the progress of transpersonal methods,
but need not be working tools of transpersonal practice.
But I do this in the hopes that some appreciation of
those aspects can be enjoyable even if one is not
particularly interested in too many of their details, and
to that end, I try to minimize the technical allusions and
give transparent characterizations of them. It is for the
curious, and maybe motivate further inquiry. I think this
view is syntonic with Marks-Tarlow’s desire to explain
fractals as relevant to the transpersonal mission.
I have long been an admirer of the writing
of Terry Marks-Tarlow (since 1991 by personal
contact and from some of her publications, such as
2008) as we share a fascination of the confluence
of dynamical flavors of mathematics, semiotics, and
the mind, and thus I welcome with pleasure, the
invitation to comment on these matters.

Epistemology and Ontology—
A Yin/Yang Entanglement
pistemology and ontology are inseparable, two
perspectives on the same process. You cannot
have one without the other. You can’t fabricate
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knowledge about reality (ok, maybe there is no
such thing) unless you have some concept or
commitment to the nature of reality, and your
concepts about the nature of reality are under
constant revision as you continue to investigate it.
There is an ongoing dialogue between them, thus
they are parts of an organic, holistic, process, no
longer to be considered as parts. This is especially
true when one is concerned with the mind, because
the organ of knowing is the object of investigation.
Which is why Smith “Smitty” Stevens referred to
psychology as the “propaedeutic science” (Stevens,
1936). Terry (this issue – and all future citations refer
to her paper in this issue) states that “transpersonal
psychology aimed to transcend limitations of
research and methods [currently] available.” For
transpersonal psychology, transcendence is not only
related to going beyond the limitations of current
research methods, but also to the achieving of “peak
experiences”, and to Maslow’s “fourth force in
psychology” which goes beyond self-actualization
and includes mystical, ecstatic, and spiritual states
of mind (Maslow, 1988). So, there is an ontology of
mind that is entangled with its epistemology, which
confronts the gap between objective and subjective
ways of knowing. How do we resolve the problem
of reconciling the scientific modes of investigating
mind from subjective ways of knowing?
Some of the proto-transcendental issues have
engaged earlier psychologists, from various positions,
such as James (pragmatism and pure empiricismi.e.,
pure experience; James, 1907; Perry, 1954) and
Jung (analytic psychology; Jung, 1969), which, by
the way, brings in discussions on the philosophy
of science, including the analytic philosophies of
logical positivism and operationalism. It has been
said that analytic philosophy brought about the
seeds of its own destruction (Rajchman, 1985; Rorty,
1982, p. 227), and I think that pursuit of any extreme
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position does the same: to take a purely subjective
route to knowledge about the mind cannot escape
discovering that by itself, it cannot be trusted, it needs
some additional evidence. And contrary-wise, to
take a purely operational view forces one to concede
that much is lost in ignoring the uniqueness of
personal knowledge. Bridgman himself went through
a remarkable and passionate evolution following
his original pronouncements of operationalism
(Bridgman, 1936). He was concerned with the whole
scientific process including the life and personality
of the scientist, the experience of the scientist, to
which operational procedures, that is, research, were
but a part. But even these were subject to solipsism
involved in the observational events. I would contend
though, that with proper controls and experimental
replication, the uniqueness of the observation can
be factored out. However, uniqueness remains
concerning experimental contexts, and the choice of
experimental subject matters and procedures, and in
the interpretation of the results.
James and Jung both brought in transcendental
features to their mental ontology, James through his
radical empiricism (James, 2007; Perry, 1954), and
Jung via the transgenerational and synchronistic
aspects of the collective unconscious and
archetypes. But both promoted a reconciliation
between the subjective and objective, a wedding
of the two. In discussing how the anima brings
material from the unconsciousness to images in
consciousness, he states, “For me, reality meant
scientific comprehension. I had to draw concrete
conclusions from the insights the unconscious had
given me.” (Jung, 1989, p. 188).
This statement is an anathema to the general
principals of scientific investigation that evolved
from the positivist approach, which rested upon
reliabilityreplications that are consistentand
validitymeasurements that represent variables
which first, can be defined, second can be translated
into experimental procedures, and third are either of
intrinsic interest or closely related to the aspects of
reality that you wish them to reveal. Furthermore,
they should exhibit lawful relationships among
themselves, and if you are lucky, they generalize to
many more situations than those from which they are
initially derived. These features obviate, by definition,
Epistemology of the Neurodynamics of Mind

the uniqueness of the contextual issues, including
the hope, fears, and insights of the investigator.
Heraclitus’s not stepping in the same stream twice
holds for James’ “stream of consciousness”. Of
course, Jung’s observations of his own mind do not
meet some of Steven’s criteria for being science. But
in other ways, they do meet some of the scientific
criteria (Jung, 1989). One of Stevens properties of
operational psychology reads “What becomes
acceptable psychology accrues only when all
observations, including those which a psychologist
makes upon himself, are treated as though made on
‘the other one.’” (Stevens, 1939, p. 230). Of course,
this is what Jung was claiming that his probing his
own mind was doing. In the 20th century, academic
psychology tended to despair introspection as it
allowed personal biases to unconsciously infect
both data and interpretation, which is evident in
Jung’s description of his personal experiences,
despite which he evolved from them some of the
most popular ideas in analytic psychology, which
still command professional and lay respect. When
Loren Riggs attached mirrors on his cornea and
discovered that stabilized retinal images faded and
disappeared, that finding seemed more in line with
Stevens requirement for the objectivity of experience
as “the other one” (Riggs et al., 1953).
It has been suggested that collections
of many brain cells must be involved and that
networks within and between them, as in Hebbian
“cell assemblies” (see Abraham, 2011, p. 25) stand
at the core of integrative brain activity in cognition.
Freeman’s use of Lashley’s “mass action”, and “cellassembly”- are central to his theories and his attack
on single-neuron doctrines. Difficulties in cognitive
neuroscience pose serious challenges to reliability
and validity.
Aesthetics, Conflict Theory, and Fractals
undt (1874) developed a conflict theory of
aesthetics in which differential strengths of
aversive and attractive response curves led to an
inverted-U ( hereafter) arousal function toward
artistic images. The -function simply describes
some dependent variable that reaches a maximum
between the lowest and highest values of another,
independent variable. In Wundt’s case, aesthetic
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enjoyment reaches it maximum between the lowest
and highest values of some aspects of the images
being viewed, in which case competing aversive
and attractive hedonic aspects (intervening variables)
mediate the  relationship. This  is ubiquitous not
only in many psychological functions, but in nature as
well—for example, crop yield as a function of rainfall.
Conflict theory was further developed by a
behavioral, physiological psychologist, Neal Miller
(1959), in the 1930’s. He was studying rats in mazes
in an attempt to provide a behavioral model for a
phenomenological personality feature, namely
Freud’s “reaction formation”. He did this with a
learning paradigm where thirsty rats learned that
both shock and water lay ahead at the end of the
maze. The conflict of aversive and positive gradients
left the rats immobile before reaching the ends of
the maze, showing some instability, often oscillating
near that point of immobility at first. Again, the
. Berlyne (1971) made a career of studying such
phenomena (and also of studying curiosity), and one
feature he studied was the complexity of the stimuli
used to simulate aesthetic images. He invoked
Wundt in explaining his  findings. Others got
similar results, and several mathematical theories
were developed to explain them, but the stimuli used
in these experiments were quite crude. Subsequent
studies have use more aesthetic images and more
sophisticated mathematical theories (Abraham et al.,
2011; Aks & Sprott, 1996; Draves, Abraham, Viotti,
& Abraham, 2008; Mitina & Abraham, 2003).
These new studies used “chaotic” or “strange”
attractors as stimulimathematicallygenerated
images which enabled two things pertinent to the thesis
of objective analysis of experience. The first is that they
provide an objective metric, the fractal dimension, of
the complexity of the images, the independent variable.
Secondly, they provided a more authentic aesthetic
experience, the measurement of which constituted
the dependent variable. This combination, we feel,
provides a more adequate science of experience; a
more convincing validation of the  relationship of
aesthetic experience to complexity.
When several factors interact, whether
measures of some real process, or constructs in
mathematical models, their behavior follows a path
that evolves over time, such that they tend to form
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complex patterns (“attractors”) of varying degrees
of complexity. Some forces tend to make the path
converge to the attractor, while other tend to force it
do diverge from it. For Wundt, Berlyne, and our work,
these forces appear to be the opposing, conflicting
forces of pleasantness and unpleaseantness of the
images, arising from their complexity (and likely
other factors). The aesthetic experience is optimum
when these forces of convergence and divergence
within an attractor-space are properly balanced
for a given individual. The fractal dimension, in
other words represents that ratio which produces
the most enjoyable approach to the perceptual
attractor, and typically is within a midrange of fractal
dimensionality. Mitina discusses related personality
traits (Mitina & Abraham, 2003).
Our studies (Abraham et al., 2011; Mitina &
Abraham, 2003) contained another feature differing
from others’ studies, in that we asked the subjects
to rate the complexity of the images, which not too
surprising gave nearly identical  functions. Thus,
aesthetic and complexity judgements are linearly
correlated, which raises the question of which is
primary, the complexity of the percept or the act of
appraisal of the aesthetic? The question of primacy of
various factors is at the foundation of much cognitive
neuroscience, which suggests a holistic interpretation
is most evident in the “Action-Perception Cycle” of
Freeman (2000, 2007) and the “Perception-Action
Cycle” of Fuster (2004, 2017).
Neurodynamics of Phenomenology
hile Galen may have been the first to suggest
the brain as the locus of the mind, Wundt may
have been among the first to attempt to measure the
extent of the brain’s influence on decision-making
behavior. He used reaction-time measurements and
imputed brain-mind operations in research using
mathematical evaluation of differences in the reactiontimes attributable to different cognitive components
of various tasks—for example, the time for a choice
reaction minus the latency for a simple reaction could
yield the time the brain uses to distinguish which of
two lights turned on. Modern cognitive neuroscientist
are pretty much still at it, but with much more
sophisticated experimental and mathematical tools.
They use various measurements of brain activity,
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mostly electrophysiological and neuroimaging. I will
take the iconic program of Freeman as an example
(Freeman & Skarda, 1985; Skarda & Freeman, 1987;
Freeman, 2000, 2007; see also Abraham, 2017, 2020;
Liljenström, 2018). His program is predicated on a
few basic viewpoints: (1) The collective activity of
nerve cells in a given region (nucleus or area) is more
important than the activity of any particular cell; (2)
Within a given region, there is a subset of cells that are
more likely to be used in a particular mental activity:
(3) This subset may vary from one instance to another;
(4) Different (and possibly overlapping) subsets
may be utilized by different mental functions; (5)
Interconnection and thus communications within and
between regions form functional networks, and some
of their activities can be meaningful and be measured
from micro-, to meso-, to macroscopic levels,
spatially and temporally; (6) These communications
are interactive (centrifugal-centripetal loops); and (7)
These networks can be considered as self-organizing,
dynamical systems.
Freeman and his colleagues used a
quintessential learning situation with odors as stimuli,
and made EEG measurements on an innovational
dense 8x8 array of electrodes on the olfactory bulb.
Initially he was asking the question, is there a spatial
(topological) mapping that discriminates one odor
from another, the way auditory maps spatially in the
brain (tonotopically), vision with a color mapping,
somatosensory with a homunculus. They noted two
types of EEG patterns, one in bursts, in synchrony
with breathing and with a peak within the gamma
range (above 25 Hz). The other one a messy mix of
frequencies similar to a normal EEG. They analyzed
these bursts, and plotted 3D maps of the amplitude
of various parameters of the EEG over the surface
of the bulb being recorded, and found that while
there might have been a hint of coding for the
different odors, the maps could be quite variable.
Karl Pribram once mentioned to me (ca. 1990?) that
this variability was a serious failure in reliability. At
that time, I agreed as I had already noted that. But,
as I shall soon show, this variability led Freeman
to his principal conjectures about the relation of
phenomenology to brain functioning.
Freeman noted that these two types of EEG
patterns often alternated, and that one of them could

An overall picture of brain functioning is that
there are integrative systems of many distributed
brain areas and events. There may be several
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be viewed as a cyclic (periodic attractor) and the other
messier (chaotic attractor), and thus be suspected of
involvement in the evolution of thought processes in
the brain. These would comprise a series of transitions
(bifurcations), with relatively stability between
bifurcations and instability near the bifurcations.
He summarized a sensory, perceptual, motor, and
cognitive aspects of the system in a schema he called
the “Action-Perception Cycle,” which he also calls the
“intentional arc”. Goal oriented intention is involved in
the interactions, that is, sensation becomes important
because the person is forming attractor landscapes
which modulates all aspects of the interactions
involved (Freeman, 2000, 2007).
Skarda (2018) emphasizes that it is best to
think of the process as holistic. Fuster (2017, appendix
1) proposes a similar “Perception-Action Cycle,” differing from Freeman’s, according to Kozma (Kozma &
Noack, 2017), by emphasizing sensation as initiating
such a sequence, rather than intention doing most of
the initiation.
There may be high-dimensional (chaotic)
attractors going in the Cycle, particularly in the
cortical-sensory “preafference” loop, which can
bifurcate to low-dimensional (nearly cyclic), with the
sudden appearance of an unexpected stimulus. I have
suggested that sometime one (sensory/perceptual),
sometimes the other (intentional, coritco-cognitive)
aspect may be primary in the initiation of the cycle
(Abraham, 2017). A more contemporary example of
such bifurcational behavior occurs at the microscopic
(microelectrode) level in monkey prefrontal cortex
in studies of working memory (Spaak et al., 2017).
Freeman’s debt re intentionality to his mentor, Karl
Pribram (Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960)., can be
seen his definition:
Intentionality is the circular process of generalization/abstraction of input and specification/
concretization of output by which brains achieve
understanding of their environments through
the cycle of prediction, action, sensation, perception, and assimilation by learning. (Freeman,
2007, first sentence)
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different systems active at the same time. Some
may use shared areas and processes as well as
unique areas. There may be switching between their
relative dominance in mental activity; instabilities
are responsible for these bifurcations to stable
dominance of one or a few systems (“metastability”;
see Abraham, 2017; Fingelkurts et al., 2017; Freeman
& Holmes, 2005; Kelso & Tagnoli, 2017; Liljenström,
2017; Mannino & Bressler, 2017).
While Freeman felt the qualia of experience
lay beyond the reach of neuroscientific observation,
he did feel that investigation of this intentional
arc would elaborate the neurodynamics of the
mental activity that supported such qualia. The
mental activity need not be conscious, in fact
he suggested that it is mostly unconscious and
intermittently becomes conscious. I am not fond of
the term “consciousness." and prefer to use “levels
of awareness." A picky concern, but this avoids
the binary implications in some uses of the terms
“conscious” and “unconscious.”
So where does the idea of fractal come
in? Simply in that chaos, which is involved in most
mental, behavioral, and neural processes, has fractal
properties. The most frequently used mathematical
characterizations of the complexity of a chaotic
attractor is designated as its “fractal dimension” and
“Lyapunov Sprectrum” (Abraham, 2014; Abraham,
Abraham & Shaw, 1990; Abraham & Shaw, 2005;
Marks-Tarlow, 2020 [this issue]). Liljenström has
shown an -function of “the rate of convergence
to a stored limit cycle memory state” as a function
of different levels of noise (I am taking “noise” as
an equivalant of “complexity”) introduced into
units [neurons] in a model of the olfactory system
(Liljenström, fig. 8, p. 61). This could indicate that,
just as with aesthetics, optimal levels of complexity
in brain function may facilitate or be indicative of
optimal evolution of thought and action.
In summary, we might say that studies show
that brain and mind undergo dynamic metastable
variability over time which we attribute, not to
measurement error, but to perturbations of mental
and neural activity that possess measurable fractal/
chaotic properties. Some, as Freeman (2000, 2007)
and many of his cabal conjecture, intentionality
must be a major feature of the stream of mental and
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neural activity. But can we conjure up experimental
designs that come closer to the confluence of
the objective means of investigation and the
phenomenology of mental activity? I offer one
example of a clever type of experimental design that
purports to do just that. It involves measurement
of brain activity in humans while their thinking is
under intentional control.
Inner speech (talking to one’s self silently), has
been studied intensely over the past 20 years or so,
developing research methods that defy the difficulties
involved. Much of it has been directed to Vygotsky’s
(1987) concepts the socialization in children, which
played an important part in the development of
thought in children (e.g., Cole & Wertsch, 1996).,
and vice versa, an interactive process, not unlike
Freeman’s and Fuster’s cycles discussed previously,
which are obviously involved in speech development.
Ferneyhough nicely précises Vygotsky:
Children deliberately repurpose words that
they have previously used successfully in social
interactions with other individuals. Instead of
regulating the behavior of others, they were
getting the hang of using language to control
themselves. (Ferneyhough, 2017, p. 77)
Thus, dialogue is a self-organizational system.
In public speaking, people regulate each other. In
inner speech and private speech (speaking to oneself
out loud), one is controlling oneself. This is also like
Vitello’s highlighting a metaphor similar to one oft
used by Freeman, “a jazz combo, which does not
need a conductor” (Vitello, 1917, p. 163).
Experiments
led
by
Ferneyhough’s
colleague, Alderson-Day (Alderson-Day et al., 2016)
compared “dialogic inner speech” to “monologic
inner speech.” Neuroimaging (fMRI) revealed that
both would activate brain networks involved in
speech (left frontotemporal language regions), but
that the dialogic condition involved additional areas
“associated with a widespread bilateral network
including left and right superior temporal gyri,
precuneus, posterior cingulate and left inferior and
medial frontal gyri” (Anderson-Day et al., 2016, p.
110). These areas are also associated with switching
in visual perspective, and socializing. Again, there
is an analogy and perhaps the implication of
Abraham

support from the macroscopic level of investigation
(neuroimaging), of the kind of metastable switching
involved in the findings of the various authors
mentioned in the Freeman cabal (those mentioned in
Abraham, 2017), much of it in the mesoscopic level
of measurement. At any rate, this work shows that
subtle nuances of mind can bring objective methods
to bear on mental activity. It especially shows that
differences in brain activity, even if there is much
left to elucidate in terms of micro- and mesoscopic
dynamics, gives credence to conjectured aspects of
distinguishing nuanced functions of thought. There
is progress in the neuroscience of the dynamics of
mind.
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Creativity
final word about creativity. The brain, mind, and
body are entwined holistically (Marks-Tarlow,
this issue). The stream of this process meanders a
trajectory varying from more creative processes to
more focused processes. That is, they vary between
high-dimensional chaotic processes arising from
instability and greater aspects of divergent thinking
and more stable low-dimensional chaotic, nearly
periodic or static attractive conditions (Abraham,
1996, 2007; Abraham, Krippner, & Richards,
2012; Guilford, 1959; Gardner, 1993). These selforganizational processes are necessarily involved in
creativity, such as that of improvisation in playing
jazz, comedy, and speech. They are also evident in
psychotherapy, transpersonal and otherwise, and
psychotherapy in turn depends on the brain-mind
processes we have discussed, which itself represents
the fractal property of similarity across scale that
Terry has so well described.
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